Composite-order bilinear groups provide many structural features that have proved useful for both constructing cryptographic primitives and as a technique in security reductions. Despite these convenient features, however, composite-order bilinear groups are less desirable than prime-order bilinear groups for reasons of efficiency. A recent line of work has therefore focused on translating these structural features from the composite-order to the prime-order setting; much of this work focused on two such features, projecting and canceling, in isolation, but a recent result due to Seo and Cheon showed that both features can be obtained simultaneously in the prime-order setting.
Introduction
Since their introduction in 2005 by Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [7] , composite-order bilinear groups have been used to construct a diverse set of advanced cryptographic primitives, including (hierarchical) identity-based encryption [20, 22] , group signatures [9, 10] , and functional and attribute-based encryption [17, 21, 19] . The main assumptions used to prove the security of such schemes are variants of the subgroup decision assumption, which (in the simplest case) states that, for a bilinear group G of order N = pq, without an element of order q it should be hard to distinguish a random element of G from a random element of order p. Such assumptions crucially rely on the hardness of factoring N .
Beyond this basic assumption and its close variants, many of these schemes have exploited additional structural properties that come with using composite-order bilinear groups. Two such properties, projecting and canceling, were formally identified by Freeman [13] ; projecting requires (roughly) that there exists a trapdoor projection map from G into its p-order subgroup (and a related map in the target group G T ), and canceling requires that elements in the p-order and q-order subgroups cancel each other out (i.e., yield the identity when paired). Additionally, Lewko [18] identified another property, parameter hiding, that requires (again, roughly) that elements in the p-order subgroup reveal nothing about seemingly correlated elements in the q-order subgroup.
While therefore quite attractive and rich from a structural standpoint, the use of composite-order bilinear groups comes with a number of drawbacks, both in terms of efficiency and security. Until a recent construction of Boneh, Rubin, and Silverberg [8] , all known composite-order bilinear groups were on supersingular, or Type-1 [14] , curves. Even in the prime-order setting, supersingular curves are already less efficient than their ordinary counterparts: speed records for the former [1, 28] are approximately six times slower than speed records for the latter [2] . In the composite-order setting, it is furthermore necessary to increase the size of the modulus by at least a factor of 10 (from 160 to at least 1024 bits) in order to make the assumption that N is hard to factor plausible. Operations performed in compositeorder bilinear groups are therefore significantly slower; for example, Guillevic [15] recently observed that computing a pairing was 254 times slower. (This slowdown also extends to the non-supersingular construction of Boneh et al., and indeed to any composite-order bilinear group.) Furthermore, from a security standpoint, a recent result due to Hayashi et al. [16] demonstrates that in a common type of supersingular curve, namely one with embedding degree k = 6, it is possible to efficiently compute discrete logarithms; this result demonstrates that working in supersingular curves is perhaps more "dangerous" than working in their non-supersingular counterparts.
One natural question to ask is: to what extent it is possible to obtain the structural advantages of composite-order bilinear groups without the disadvantages? Although the structural properties described above might seem specific to composite-order groups, both Freeman and Lewko are in fact able to express them rather abstractly and then describe how to construct prime-order bilinear groups in which each of these individual properties are met; they also show how to translate the subgroup decision assumption into a generalized version, that in prime-order groups is implied by either Decision Linear [6] or Symmetric External Diffie Hellman (SXDH) [3] .
In contrast, Meiklejohn, Shacham, and Freeman [24] showed that it was impossible to achieve projecting and canceling simultaneously under a "natural" usage of Decision Linear; as a motivation, they presented a blind signature scheme that seemingly relied upon both projecting and canceling for its proof of security. Recently, Seo and Cheon [30] showed that it was actually possible to achieve both projecting and canceling simultaneously in prime-order groups, and Seo [29] explored both possibility and impossibility results for projecting. To derive hardness of subgroup decision in their setting, however, Seo and Cheon rely on a non-standard assumption and show that this implies the hardness of subgroup decision only in a very limited case. They also provide a prime-order version of the Meiklejohn et al. blind signature that is somewhat divorced from their setting: rather than prove its security directly using projecting and canceling, they instead alter the blind signature, introduce a new property called translating, and then show that the modified blind signature is secure not in the projecting and canceling setting, but rather in a separate projecting and translating setting.
Our contributions. In this paper, we present in Section 3 an abstract presentation of the projecting and canceling pairing due to Seo and Cheon [30] ; in the process, we eliminate their reliance on a nonstandard assumption for some instances of subgroup decision. Our presentation is based on dual pairing vector spaces [25, 26] , and it can be parameterized to yield projection properties of varying strength. This perspective yields several advantages. First, all the power of dual pairing vector spaces is embedded inside this construction and can thus be exploited as in prior works. Second, we observe that even weak projection properties are useful, and when these suffice, the hardness of subgroup decision problems is implied by SXDH. As the projection properties are strengthened, reducing to SXDH seems to become difficult, and we leave it as an interesting open problem to obtain a larger class of subgroup decision variants from just the SXDH assumption in the presence of strong projection properties. If one is willing to rely on non-standard (though still static) assumptions that can be justified in the generic group model, then we suspect that all subgroup decision variants can be obtained simultaneously with the strongest combination of properties.
Next, in Section 4, we present an IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme that uses canceling, parameter hiding, and weak projecting properties in its proof of security. Although efficient constructions of IND-CCA2-secure IBE schemes have been previously obtained by combining IND-CPA-secure HIBE schemes with signatures [11] , we nevertheless view our IBE construction as a demonstration of the applicability of our unified framework, since it leverages the combined power of dual pairing vector spaces and a form of projecting. Furthermore, our new construction does not aim to amplify security by adding new primitives; instead, it explores the existing security of the IND-CPAsecure IBE due to Boneh and Boyen [5] (which cannot be IND-CCA2 secure, as it has re-randomizable ciphertexts), and observes that, by modifying the scheme in a rather organic way and exploiting the (weak) projecting and canceling properties of the setting, we can prove IND-CCA1 security directly. In addition, our techniques demonstrate that the same subgroup structures that were used by Lewko and Waters [20] to "boost" from selective to full IND-CPA security can be further applied to "boost" all the way to full IND-CCA1-security. We therefore view our scheme as a proof of concept for the usefulness of obtaining projecting and canceling simultaneously in the prime-order setting, and believe that the usefulness of our framework extends well beyond this IBE application. We intend our work to facilitate future applications of these combined properties.
Our techniques To obtain a more user-friendly interpretation of the projecting and canceling pairing construction over prime-order groups, we begin by observing that it is essentially a concatenation of dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS). Dual pairing vector spaces were first used in prime order bilinear groups by Okamoto and Takashima [25, 26] and have since been employed in many works, in particular to instantiate dual system encryption proof techniques (as introduced by Waters [31] ) in the prime-order setting [19, 27, 18] . These previous uses of DPVS typically relied on the canceling property, variants of subgroup decision problems, and certain parameter hiding properties that are present by design in DPVS. One particularly nice feature of DPVS constructions is that a large family of useful subgroup decision variants can be proven to follow from standard assumptions like SXDH for asymmetric groups and DLIN for symmetric groups; viewing the construction of a projecting and canceling pairing as a natural extension of DPVS therefore has the twin benefits that it provides a clear guide on how to derive certain subgroup decision variants from standard assumptions, and that it comes with all the built-in tools that DPVS has to offer.
In particular, DPVS have already been used by Lewko [18] to build a fully IND-CPA-secure identitybased encryption scheme that mirrors the structure of the selectively-secure Boneh-Boyen scheme; this was accomplished by translating a fully secure composite-order variant [20] . (An asymmetric variant of this scheme was also given by Chen et al. [12] .) Now that we have added in projection, we can use it to boost this scheme to full IND-CCA1 security; again, as the core IBE scheme is re-randomizable, we cannot hope to achieve IND-CCA2 security without departing from the core structure of the scheme. Hence, we view this as an exploration of the kinds of security properties that can be proven solely from the minimalistic spirit of the Boneh-Boyen scheme.
Our technique for proving IND-CCA1 security extends from the observation due to Lewko and Waters [23] that dual system encryption proofs can be interpreted as a reduction from a full security game to a weak game in which the attacker does not have access to the public parameters. Using this technique, we first define such a weak game for IND-CCA1 security, and then prove that our IBE construction satisfies it; this is an easier task than proving full IND-CCA1 security directly, as in particular the absence of public parameters makes it difficult for the attacker to produce meaningful decryption queries. Next, leveraging the addition of projection, we reduce the full IND-CCA1 security to this weaker notion by first expanding the system to have extra components in a space that is not reflected in the public parameters, and then projecting to play the weak game in that space. We formulate our IBE scheme and proof in a unified framework that can be instantiated, as we will see in Sections 4 and 5, over prime-order or composite-order bilinear groups (relying on SXDH or generalized subgroup decision [4] respectively).
Definitions and Notation
In this section, we define bilinear groups and the three functional properties we would like them to satisfy: projecting, canceling, and parameter hiding. For the first two, we use the definitions of Freeman [13] (albeit in a somewhat modified form); for parameter hiding, on the other hand, we come up with a new formal framework. In addition to these functional properties, we consider the notion of subgroup decision in bilinear groups, in which a random element of a subgroup should be indistinguishable from a random element of the full group. The variant we define, called generalized correlated subgroup decision, is very general: in addition to seeing random elements of subgroups, we allow an attacker to see elements correlated across subgroups (e.g., elements of different subgroups with correlated randomness), and require that it is still difficult for him to distinguish between correlated elements of different subgroups. We then see in Sections 3 and 5 that many specific instances of this general notion are implied by more standard notions of subgroup decision in both prime-order and composite-order groups.
Bilinear groups
In what follows, we refer to a bilinear group as a tuple G = (N, G, H, G T , e, µ), where N is either prime or composite, |G| = |H| = kN and |G T | = N for some k, ∈ N, and e : G × H → G T is a bilinear map; i.e., e is an efficient map that satisfies both bilinearity (e(x a , y b ) = e(x, y) ab for all x ∈ G, y ∈ H, a, b ∈ Z/N Z) and non-degeneracy (e(x, y) = 1 only if x = 1 or y = 1). In some bilinear groups, we may additionally include generators g and h of G and H respectively (if G and H are cyclic), information about meaningful subgroups of G and H, or some auxiliary information µ that allows for efficient membership testing in G and H (and possibly more). In what follows, we refer to the algorithm that is used to generate such groups G as BilinearGen, and note that, beyond the security parameter, BilinearGen takes in an additional parameter n that specifies the number of desired subgroups; i.e., for (N, G, H, G T , e, µ)
H i (where typically G i and H i are cyclic).
In terms of functional properties of bilinear groups, we first define both projecting and canceling; our definitions are modified versions of the ones originally given by Freeman [13] . We give three flavors of projecting. The first, weak projecting, considers projecting into a single subgroup of the source group, without requiring a corresponding map in the target group. The second, which we call simply projecting, most closely matches the definition given by Freeman, and considers projecting into a single subgroup in both the source and target groups. Lastly, we define full projecting, which considers projecting into every subgroup individually. As we will see in Section 3, we can satisfy all of these flavors by tweaking appropriate parameters in our prime-order construction.
Definition 2.1 (Weak projecting).
A bilinear group G = (N, G, H, G T , e, µ) is weakly projecting if there exist decompositions G = G 1 ⊕ G 2 and H = H 1 ⊕ H 2 , and projection maps π G and π H such that π G (x 1 ) = x 1 for all x 1 ∈ G 1 and π G (x 2 ) = 1 for all x 2 ∈ G 2 , and similarly π H (y 1 ) = y 1 for all y 1 ∈ H 1 and π H (y 2 ) = 1 for all y 2 ∈ H 2 .
Definition 2.2 (Projecting).
A bilinear group G = (N, G, H, G T , e, µ) is projecting if there exist subgroups G ⊂ G, H ⊂ H, and G T ⊂ G T such that there exist non-trivial maps π G : G → G , π H : H → H , and π T : 
Parameter hiding
Beyond projecting and canceling, we aim to define parameter hiding. As mentioned in the introduction, this property roughly says that elements in one subgroup should not reveal anything about related elements in other subgroups, and was previously used, without a formal definition, by Lewko [18] .
The main difficulty in providing a formal definition for parameter hiding is that it is not as selfcontained a feature as projecting and canceling; elements within subgroups may be related to elements in other subgroups in a myriad of ways, and their relation to one another may depend both on the form of the element (which can essentially be any function on the exponents; e.g., g ax 1 g bx 2 2 g cx 3
3
or g ax−by+cz 1 g ay−bx+2cz 2 ) and on the subgroups. We therefore do not try to consider all types of correlations, but instead focus on one simple type, defined as follows:
We also consider correlated samples in H, but for convenience we will define a y-correlated sample from the subgroup H i 1 ⊕ H i 2 to be an element of the form h
(Note that the y is now on the first subgroup instead of the second.)
Although we choose this type of correlation mainly for ease of exposition (and because we encounter it in Section 4), our discussion below could be adjusted to accommodate more general types of correlation, and this would remain compatible with our prime-order construction in Section 3.
Intuitively then, parameter hiding says that, under certain restrictions about which subgroup elements one is allowed access to, the distributions over x-correlated samples and random samples should in fact be the same, even when x is known. (We will need some restrictions because there may be testable relationships between the images of various generators in the target group. We will give a concrete example below.) To consider which kinds of distributions we can use; i.e., what additional information we might give out besides the samples, we consider distributions D parameterized by multisets S G , S H , X, and Y , and a set C; intuitively, the sets S G and S H tell us which elements to include in the distribution, the sets X and Y tell us which correlated samples to include (e.g., x i -correlated samples for all x i ∈ X), and the set C tells us which correlated samples to change to random. Formally then, we have S G = {s 1 , . . . , s k 1 ; t 1 , . . . , t k 2 ; c 1 , . . . , c k 3 } and S H = {s 1 , . . . , s 
(This is why we use multisets, as we may want multiple random samples from the same subgroups.)
i.e., a sample of the form g a c 1,i · g ax i c 2,i for a corresponding generators on either side of the pairing, and (2) do not change correlated samples for the same value x on opposite sides of the pairing. Formally, we express these requirements as
• Don't include generators for switched samples. For all (c 1,i , c 2,i ) ∈ C, s j ∈ S G , and s ∈ S H , s j = c 1,i , c 2,i and s = c 1,i , c 2,i ; analogously, for all (c 1,i , c 2,i ) ∈ C, s j ∈ S G , and s ∈ S H , s j = c 1,i , c 2,i and s = c 1,i , c 2,i .
• Don't switch x-correlated samples in G and H. For all c i , c j ∈ C, x i = y j .
To see why these restrictions can be necessary, consider an example wherein we are trying to establish that an x-correlated sample in G 1 ⊕ G 2 is indistinguishable from a random sample in G 1 ⊕ G 2 for a known x. Suppose we are given generators h 1 and h 2 . If we are given an x-correlated sample g α 1 g αx
2
(for some random, unknown α), we can then compute e(g , then pairing these yields the identity in the target group, hence distinguishing these from two random samples. Definition 2.6 (Parameter hiding). We say that a group G = (N, G, H, G T , e, µ) satisfies parameter hiding if for all k 3 , 3 ∈ N, sets X ∈ (Z/N Z) k 3 and Y ∈ (Z/N Z) 3 , and distributions D = (S G , S H , X, Y, C) that are well-behaved in the above sense, D is identical to the distribution in which the correlated samples indicated by C are replaced with random samples. Example 2.7. As an example, consider the distribution D defined by S G = {1, 2; ; (1, 2), (3, 4)}, S H = {1, 2, 5, 6; (3, 4), (3, 4) ; (1, 2), (3, 4)}, C = {(3, 4); (3, 4)}, X = {x}, and Y = {y} for any x, y ∈ Z/N Z such that x = y; we can easily check that these sets are well-behaved in the sense defined above. Then parameter hiding holds for G = (N, G, H, G T , e, µ) if for a, b, c, d, s, t, u, v, w, z
. In our uses of parameter hiding in Section 4, we restrict ourselves to this one example. Again, this is due to the difficulty of providing a fully general definition of parameter hiding as certain types of correlated samples require more entropy than others; for example, if we wanted to switch from h zy 3 h z 4 and g w 3 g wx 4 , and then additionally from g v 3 g vx 4 , it would not be clear how to do this with the usual tricks, since these use the ambiguity in the choice of generators for G 3 , G 4 , H 3 , H 4 , which only provides a fixed amount of entropy. There would be several approaches to deal with such an issue in a particular application, like expanding G 3 , G 4 , H 3 , H 4 internally to consist of several further subgroups (thereby providing more entropy) or using a hybrid argument to avoid the necessity of switching so many samples at once. We do not find it to be overly limiting to consider this one example, in which we switch from correlated to random samples in only the spaces G 3 ⊕ G 4 and H 3 ⊕ H 4 , to keep our constructions in Section 4 simple and tailored to the requirements that we need.
Generalized correlated subgroup decision
Beyond functional properties of bilinear groups, we must also consider the types of security guarantees we can provide. The assumption we define, generalized correlated subgroup decision, considers indistinguishability between subgroups in a very general way: given certain subgroup generators and "correlated" elements across subgroups (i.e., elements in different subgroups that use the same randomness), we require that it should still be hard to distinguish between elements of other subgroups. Formally, we consider sets
. . , (p m+1 , π m+1 )}, and an indicator bit b. (We assume without loss of generality that T 2 is the larger set.) Intuitively, the sets S G and S H tells us which group elements an adversary is given, and (T 1 , T 2 , b) tell us what the challenge terms should look like. We have the following requirements for S G :
• Each singleton s i ∈ S G indicates that we are given the generators g s i .
• Each tuple
, for each i, we are given a pair of products: the first consisting of random elements in each of the subgroups of G indicated by the first component of the pair, and the second consisting of random elements in each of the subgroups of G indicated by the second component of the pair. Note that these elements are correlated, in that the same randomness is used for both. For convenience, we will restrict to pairs (p k,i , π k,i ) such that p k,i is odd and π k,i = p k,i + 1 (i.e. all pairs are chosen among (1,2), (3, 4) , (5,6) indicates H.
• For the sets T 1 and T 2 , we require that they differ in exactly one pair; i.e., there exists a unique pair P such that P / ∈ T 1 but P ∈ T 2 . For this pair P = (p, π), we require that s i = p and s i = π for any s i ∈ S G or s i ∈ S H ; i.e., we are not given the generators for these subgroups on either side of the pairing, and also that if P ∈ t i for some i (for either t i ∈ S G or t i ∈ S H ), then we must have T 1 ∩ t i = ∅; i.e., P can appear only in tuples in S G or S H that also contain another component in the challenge term. As in sets S G and S H , we require that all pairs appearing in T 1 , T 2 are elements of {(1, 2), (3, 4) , (5, 6) , . . .}. Then, assuming b = 0 (and replacing g with h if b = 1), our challenge elements are of the form
, g
Assumption 2.8 (Generalized correlated subgroup decision). For all tuples (S
isfying the requirements specified above and for any n ∈ N, for any PPT adversary A given G $ ← − BilinearGen(1 k , n) and the elements specified by S G and S H , it should be hard to distinguish between values T defined by (b, T 1 ) and values T defined by (b, T 2 ).
As an example, consider the case in which n = 6 and S G = {1, 2; ((1, 2), (3, 4) (3, 4) , (5, 6)}, and b = 0. In this case, the concrete assumption is: Given G and generators g 1 , g 2 , h 1 , h 2 , h 5 , h 6 , correlated samples from G 1 ⊕ G 3 and G 2 ⊕ G 4 , correlated samples from H 1 ⊕ H 3 and H 2 ⊕ H 4 , and correlated samples from H 3 ⊕ H 5 and H 4 ⊕ H 6 , it should be hard to distinguish correlated samples from
A Prime-Order Bilinear Group Satisfying All Features
Our ultimate goal in this section is to define a prime-order bilinear group that satisfies all three of the properties defined in the previous section: projecting, canceling, and parameter hiding; additionally, we want to require that subgroup decision is hard in this group. Our construction can be viewed as an abstraction of the construction of Seo and Cheon [30] , which they prove satisfies (regular) projecting, canceling, and a somewhat restrictive notion of subgroup decision. In contrast, our construction satisfies canceling and parameter hiding, is flexible enough to achieve any of the three flavors of projecting we defined in the previous section (depending on the parameter choices), and comes equipped with reductions for more general instances of subgroup decision.
Notationally, we augment the bilinear groups G discussed in the previous section. In particular, we now focus only on the case when the group order is some prime p, and consider groups B = (p, B 1 , B 2 , B T , E, µ) built on top of groups G = (p, G, H, G T , e); this means B 1 , B 2 , and B T may contain multiple copies of G, H, and G T respectively (formally, B 1 , B 2 , and B T are all F p -modules), and that the map E uses e as a component. Because we are moving to these bigger spaces, we must also include a value µ that allows us to test membership in the groups B 1 and B 2 ; as an example, consider the case in which B 1 ⊂ G × G and one can test for membership in G. Then, while it is easy to test for membership in G × G, we must give out additional information µ that allows one to (efficiently) test for membership in B 1 .
Our construction crucially uses dual pairing vector spaces, which were introduced by Okamoto and Takashima [25, 26] and have been previously used to provide pairings E : G n × H n → G T , built on top of pairings e : G × H → G T , that satisfy the canceling property. As we cannot have a cyclic target space if we want to satisfy projecting or full projecting, however, we instead need a map whose image is G d T for some d that can be larger than 1. Intuitively, we achieve this by piecing together d "blocks," where each block is an instance of a dual pairing vector space; the construction of Seo and Cheon is then obtained as the special case in which d = n, and dual pairing vector spaces as defined by Okamoto and Takashima are obtained with d = 1. More formally, we begin with a key definition:
We note that one can efficiently sample a random pair of dual orthonormal bases (B, B * ) by sampling first a random basis B and then solving uniquely for B * using linear algebra over 
. Alternatively, we can view each v j as a d × n matrix, where the i-th row is b j,i . We denote the concatenation of (B 1 , . . . ,
To begin our construction, we build off of a group G = (p, G, H, G T , e, g, h), where g and h are generators of G and H respectively, and consider groups B 1 ⊂ G dn and B 2 ⊂ H dn . Notationally, we write an element of B 1 as g A , where
, and furthermore define the bilinear map E :
Observe that the i-th coordinate of the image is equal to e(g, h) A i ·B i mod p , where A i and B i denote the i-th rows of A and B respectively. Then, to begin to see how our construction will satisfy projecting and canceling, we have the following lemma: , h) , . . . , e(g, h)) ∀j and E(g
Proof. By the definition of the pairing, we have for any j and k that , h) , . . . , e(g, h)). For the second property, we again use the definition of dual orthonormal bases to see that b j,i · b * k,i ≡ 0 mod p for all j = k, and thus
While Lemma 3.3 therefore shows us directly how to obtain canceling, for projecting we are still mapping into a one-dimensional image. To obtain more dimensions, it turns out we need only perform some additional scalar multiplication. We give the following definition:
we define the scaling of these bases by C to be new bases
Intuitively then, we use the entries in the i-th column of C to scale the vectors in the basis B i and obtain the basis D i . We observe that, as we still have b j,i · b * k,i ≡ 0 mod p for j = k, multiplication by a scalar will not affect this and we still satisfy canceling. The scalar values do, however, build in extra dimensions into the image of our pairing, as demonstrated by the following lemma:
Proof. By the definition of the pairing, we have for any j and k that
. If j = k, then the fact that (B i , B * i ) are dual orthonormal for all i implies by definition that b j,i · b * j,i ≡ 1 mod p for all i and j, and thus c j,
For the second property, we again use the definition of dual orthonormal bases to see that
We are now ready to give our full construction of an algorithm BilinearGen , parameterized by integers n and d, and a distribution D n,d on n×d matrices, to achieve a setting B = (p,
We present this construction in Algorithm 1, and demonstrate that it satisfies projecting, canceling, parameter hiding, and subgroup decision.
The generality of this construction stems from the choices of d, n, and D; in fact, by choosing different values for these parameters, we can satisfy each of the different flavors of projecting from Section 2. To satisfy fully projecting, we must choose C from a distribution supported on matrices of full rank n and have d ≥ n. If we use a less restrictive distribution, we obtain weaker projection capabilities and a more efficient construction (as we can have d < n) when projecting onto all subgroups individually is not needed: to achieve (regular) projecting, we can use d > 1 and pick C to be of rank > 1, and to achieve weak projecting we can in fact use d = 1 and pick C to be the vector consisting of all 1 entries. Algorithm 1 BilinearGen : generate a bilinear group B that satisfies projecting and canceling
Pick values g and h such that G = g and H = h .
are a basis of W, one can therefore
are a basis for the subspace W * of F n p consisting of vectors orthogonal to vectors in the span of v * 1 , . . . , v * n . Proof. Given that our construction was specifically designed to satisfy the conditions for Lemma 3.5, we immediately obtain canceling. To satisfy projecting, we additionally need to construct the projection maps π ij and argue that they satisfy the requirements of Definition 2.3 (in the case that C is full rank). By the way our subgroups are defined, each projection map π 1i within the group B 1 must map an arbitrary element g a 1 v 1 +···+an vn of B 1 to g a i v i ∈ B 1,i ; similarly, π 2i must map h a *
. For π 1i , we observe that it can be computed efficiently by anyone knowing v i and another vector in F dn p that is orthogonal to v k for all k = i. The situation for π 2i is analogous. As for the projection maps π T,i required for the target space, we define π T,i to map an element e(g, h) a 1 C 1 +···+anCn to e(g, h) a i C i , where we recall C i denotes the i-th row of the scaling matrix C (C i is thus a vector in F d p for all i). Finally, we show that the required associativity property holds, namely that
, and for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d. To see this, observe that g M ∈ B 1 implies that g M = g α 1 v 1 +···+αn vn for some α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ F p , and similarly that h A = h β 1 v * 1 +···+βn v * n . We therefore have that
where this last equality follows from Lemma 3.5. On the other hand, we have that
and the two quantities are therefore equal. A similar argument applies to obtaining more limited projections when C has lower rank.
As discussed in Section 2, the definitions we provide for the other two desirable properties -parameter hiding and hardness of subgroup decision -are both highly general. To ease exposition, we therefore focus on establishing these properties for only the specific instances we need in Section 4, although these are by no means the only instances for which parameter hiding and subgroup decision hold. This means restricting our attention to the case where n = 8, d = 1, C is a matrix with all 1 entries. For succinctness here and in later sections, we use BasicGen(1 k ) = BilinearGen (1 k , 8, 1, D) , where D produces matrices with all 1 entries; i.e., we use BasicGen to produce the specific setting in which we are interested.
We consider two variants of this setting, which differ only in the auxiliary information µ. For µ as defined above in Algorithm 1, we show that the required instances of the correlated subgroup decision assumption are implied by SXDH. We additionally consider a case where µ is augmented to contain the following three pieces of information: (1) Proof. This is essentially Lemmas 3 and 4 in [18] , and is a consequence of the following observation. We consider sampling a random pair of dual orthonormal bases F, F * of F 8 p , and let A be an invertible 2 × 2 matrix over F p . We consider the 8 × 2 matrix F whose columns are equal to f 3 and f 4 . Then F A is also an 8 × 2 matrix, and we form a new basis B from F and A by taking these columns in place of f 3 , f 4 . To form the dual basis B * , we similarly multiply the matrix with columns f * 3 , f * 4 by the transpose of A −1 . It is noted in [18] that the resulting distribution of B, B * is equivalent to choosing this pair randomly, and in particular, this distribution is independent of the choice of A. Lemma 4 in [18] observes that if take x = y and define x to be the transpose of (1, x) and y to the be transpose of (y, −1), then choosing random scalars γ, λ in F p and a random matrix A over F p yields that the joint distribution of λA −1 x and γA T y is negligibly close to the uniform distribution over We now show -again restricting our attention to the BasicGen setting -that certain "nice" instances of the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption follow from SXDH. By "nice," we mean that the instance of the assumption behaves as follows: if the challenge terms are in H (the situation is analogous if they are in G), then there is a single pair in S that is common to the challenge sets T 1 and T 2 that appears in all tuples in S G that also contain the differing pair. In other words, the given correlated samples from the opposite side of the challenge that include the differing space must also be attached to a particular space that is guaranteed to be present in the challenge term. As we will see, this feature turns out to be convenient for reducing to SXDH, as demonstrated by the following lemmas. For the augmented construction, we additionally restrict to instances where each correlated sample t i in S G or S H is contained within the set S := {(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)} (this is to avoid the additional information in µ from compromising the hardness).
Lemma 3.8. For the augmented construction, the nice instances of the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption, where additionally each correlated sample t i in S G or S H is contained within the set {(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)}, are implied by the SXDH assumption.
Proof. We consider a nice instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption parameterized by sets S G and S H containing singletons and tuples of the pairs (1, 2), (3, 4) , (5, 6 ) and challenge sets T 1 and T 2 differing by one pair. We assume without loss of generality that the differing pair is (3, 4) , that (1, 2) is a common pair to both T 1 , T 2 , and the challenge terms are in G.
We assume we are given an SXDH challenge of the form (g, h, g a , g b , T ), where T = g ab or is random in G. We will simulate the specified instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption. We first choose a random dual orthonormal bases pair F, F * for F 8 p . We then implicitly define B, B * as follows:
We note that (B, B * ) are properly distributed, since applying a linear transformation to randomly sampled dual orthonormal bases while preserving orthonormality produces equivalently distributed bases. We observe that v 7 , v 8 , v * 7 , v * 8 are known, as are the spans of { v 1 , . . . , v 6 } and { v * 1 , . . . , v * 6 }. Thus we can produce the specified auxiliary information µ.
Since we have h, g, g a , we can produce all generators except h 3 , h 4 . Since (3, 4) is the differing pair for the challenges, these generators cannot be required. Since all generators are known on the G side, any correlated samples in G are easy to produce. To produce correlated samples for tuples containing (1, 2) and (3, 4) in H, we simply choose random exponents t , z ∈ Z p and implicitly set t = az + t . We can then produce h
To produce the challenge terms, we compute
If (5, 6) is also common to T 1 , T 2 , we can use the generators g 5 , g 6 to add on properly distributed terms in these subgroups as well.
The same proof can also be applied more generally when µ is not augmented, resulting in:
, all nice instances of the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption are implied by SXDH.
Although we do not use any non-nice instances of the generalized correlated decision assumption in this work, it is interesting to ask which of the more complex instances can be reduced to SXDH or other static assumptions. For values of d > 1, the additional structure required to achieve projecting seems to make reducing to SXDH difficult. For these cases, reducing to other static assumptions with more structure than SXDH (having higher degree relationships between exponent variables, for example) is much easier, and we do not know if reducing all the way down to SXDH is achievable or not. We leave this as an interesting question for future work.
An IBE with IND-CCA1 Security
With our bilinear setting in place, we now consider how to make use of the properties it simulates; i.e., explore what benefits the combination of projecting, canceling, parameter hiding, and subgroup decision yields. As mentioned in the introduction, the application we provide is an IND-CCA1-secure identitybased encryption scheme. Although IND-CCA2-secure IBE schemes have already been constructed, we believe our techniques are more generally useful beyond this single application.
At its heart, our construction can be thought of as a variant on the Boneh-Boyen scheme, which is IND-CPA secure (and is clearly not IND-CCA2 secure, as it has re-randomizable ciphertexts). By adding in various components in different subgroups, we first show (using canceling, parameter hiding, and subgroup decision variants) that our construction satisfies a weak notion of IND-CCA1 security, in which the adversary does not even get to see the public parameters. While such a notion might not seem to be very useful on its own, we next show that, by folding in weak projecting for additional subgroups, we are able to boost up to full IND-CCA1 security. This is a new application of projecting that requires only a mild expansion of the structure of the original scheme and fits in nicely with the evolution of dual system encryption techniques.
The high-level idea of the construction and proof is as follows. We start with the core Boneh-Boyen construction and embed it into groups with several canceling subgroups; we then add decryption checks to confirm that the ciphertext conforms to the appropriate structure in certain subgroups. Now, we observe that if an adversary is not given the public parameters, it can attempt to produce well-formed decryption queries only using the information it gains from key requests. We can apply a dual-system encryption approach to add random components to these keys in a subgroup that we also add to the ciphertext. Now, since everything in this "semi-functional" subgroup is randomized, the adversary cannot learn the appropriate structure that is being tested for by the decryption oracle. Hence, the only successful decryption queries it can produce must avoid this semi-functional space; we can use an adversary who produces such a query while receiving elements with random semi-functional components, however, to break a variant of subgroup decision. In this weak security game where no public parameters are given out, we can therefore prove IND-CCA1 security. Our notion of the weak game here is inspired by the new interpretation of dual system encryption techniques developed by Lewko and Waters [23] .
To reduce full IND-CCA1 security to this weak version, we enlarge the space of our weakly secure scheme by adding two more subgroups so that we can project separately onto the components of the embedded scheme and the additional space; our construction then places meaningful components only in this additional space. To prove security, we first expand into the embedded space using a variant of subgroup decision. We now have a "shadow" copy of the scheme, attached to both keys and ciphertexts, that is not reflected in the public parameters, and we can project separately onto the real copy and onto this shadow copy. Thus, we can reduce full security to the weak security of the shadow scheme by having the reduction create the components in the real space itself and use projection to interpolate between an adversary on the full game and a challenger for the weak game.
An IBE with weak IND-CCA1 security
We first define a weak version of IND-CCA1 security for IBE, in which the adversary does not get to see the full public parameters, but only the bilinear group: Definition 4.1. For a bilinear group generator BilinearGen, an IBE (Setup, KeyExt, Enc, Dec), an adversary A, and a bit b, let p A b (k) be the probability of the event that b = 0 in the following game:
• Step 2. (state, m 0 , m 1 , id * ) $ ← − A Dec(params,msk ,·,·),KeyExt(params,msk ,·) (G).
• Step 3. If |m 0 | = |m 1 | or A queried its KeyExt oracle on id * , output ⊥. Otherwise, output
We say that the IBE satisfies weak IND-CCA1 security if for all PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that
For our bilinear group, we require six subgroups on each side of the pairing; this means we run G = (N, G, H, G T , e, {g i } 
G × H → G T , µ allows one to check membership in both G and H, and N is the maximum order of any element in these groups. We require that the message space is the cyclic subgroup generated by e(g 1 , h 1 ) in G T . Our construction relies generically on the structure of the group and thus can be instantiated, as we see below, in either composite-order groups, using N as a product of distinct primes, or prime-order groups, using N as a prime. In addition to the regular canceling (and parameter hiding) requirements, we also require that specific generators g i ∈ G i and h i ∈ H i for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, are chosen such that
Although this might seem like an additional requirement, as we see below and in Section 5, this property can be trivially constructed in prime-order and composite-order settings that satisfy the regular notion of canceling. This same sort of reorganization could also be applied to the original Boneh-Boyen construction by conceptualizing keys and ciphertexts as single elements in G × G instead of as pairs of elements in G, and more generally we consider the distinction between single group elements in a larger group and tuples of elements in a smaller group a matter of taste. (Of course, thinking of G × G as a single group results in certain cases of subgroup decision problems being easy, such as distinguishing G × 1 G from G × G, but these cases will not come up.) Armed with such a bilinear group, we begin by presenting our IBE construction.
• Setup(G): • Dec(params, sk id , c): Check that c 2 ∈ G and that e(c 2 , sk id,2 ) = 1; output ⊥ if either of these does not pass. Otherwise, output M := c 1 · e(c 2 , sk id,1 ) −1 .
In addition, we note that msk can be used to decrypt directly; i.e., rather than form sk id and decrypt in the usual way, we can instead compute M = c 1 · e(c 2 , h α 1 ) −1 . 
where the first equality follows from canceling and the last equality follows from Equation 2. Additionally, decryption succeeds in recovering the message, as
where the second equality again follows from canceling and the last from Equation 2. To actualize these abstract requirements, for completeness we consider in Section 5 how they are satisfied in a composite-order bilinear group. In the prime-order setting, we already gave our augmented BasicGen construction in Section 3 (which we recall uses n = 8, d = 1, a scaling matrix C with all 1 entries, and auxiliary information µ that allows for a membership test in the first six subgroups), and proved that it satisfied canceling and parameter hiding, and that all nice instances of generalized correlated subgroup decision hold if SXDH holds. Our construction also uses g i = g v i and h i = h − v * i , so the definition of dual orthonormal bases ensures that Equation 2 holds as well. As all the instances we use in our proof are nice, we have the following corollary: BasicGen and augmented µ are as specified in Section 3, then the instantiation of the above construction in G is a weakly IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption scheme with identity space F p and message space G T .
To prove Theorem 4.3, we proceed through a series of game transitions as follows; formal descriptions of the games and proofs of their indistinguishability can be found in Appendix A.
• Game 0 . The honest weak IND-CCA1 game.
• Game 1 . Switch to adding in a "duplicate" component in G 3 ⊕ G 4 to the challenge ciphertext c * 2 ; i.e., the value g s 3 g s id 4 . This is indistinguishable from Game 0 by subgroup decision.
• Game 2 . Switch the G 3 ⊕ G 4 component in c * 2 to be uniformly random. This is identical to Game 1 by parameter hiding.
• Game 3 . Switch the keys returned by KeyExt to have random components in H 3 ⊕ H 4 on sk id,1 and on sk id,2 ; i.e., values h s 3 h s 4 (different values of s , s for sk id,1 and sk id,2 ). This is indistinguishable from Game 2 using a hybrid argument relying on subgroup decision and parameter hiding.
• Game 4 . Switch from performing the decryption check with a term of the form h t id 1 h t 2 h γ 5 h β 6 to using a term of the form h t id 1 h t 2 h t id
. This is indistinguishable from Game 3 by subgroup decision.
• Game 5 . Switch the Dec oracle to return ⊥ on every query in which c 2 = 1, and 1 if c 2 = 1. This is indistinguishable from Game 4 by subgroup decision and parameter hiding.
• Game 6 . Switch to encrypting a random message in the challenge ciphertext. This is indistinguishable from Game 5 by subgroup decision; furthermore, as there is now no information about the bit b, any adversary playing this game has advantage exactly zero.
Boosting to full IND-CCA1 security
With a weak IND-CCA1-secure IBE in place, we now consider how to augment it to achieve full IND-CCA1 security. Briefly, we do this by adding extra subgroups: to start, we assume we have a bilinear group G := (N, G, H, G T , e,μ)
, and e : G × H → G T , andμ allows one to efficiently test membership in G and H. Once again, these subgroups should all be canceling, and satisfy
for a particular choice of generators g i , h i . Additionally, the group generation process should also produce a trapdoor τ that allows for the efficient computation of projection maps π G and π H such that
i.e., these map into subgroups analogous to the ones that we used in our construction of a weak IND-CCA1-secure IBE. Finally, if we consider explicitly the group
T , e, µ) from our weakly secure construction, then it should be the case that from G one can create G := (N, G, H, G T , e,μ) such that G i = G i and H i = H i for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6, and τ can be derived from knowledge of µ. The message space and the space of possible identities are the same for the full scheme and the embedded weak scheme.
In our reduction to the weak IND-CCA1 security, we crucially rely on these projection maps, as well as one other property: if the groups G and H are generated from scratch, then generators for every subgroup will be known. If the groups are instead generated from the group description for the weak scheme, however, then not all such generators are known; we require that knowledge of suitable generators g 7 , g 8 , h 7 , and h 8 be incorporated in τ , but the rest of the generators may be unknown.
We now give our construction in this framework:
and sk id,2 := h t id
• Dec(params, sk id , c): First check that c 2 ∈ G and that e(c 2 , sk id,2 ) = 1; output ⊥ if equality does not hold. Otherwise, output M := c 1 · e(c 2 , sk id,1 ) −1 .
We note that decryption can again be simplified using msk ; in this case, we compute M = c 1 · e(c 2 , h α 7 ) −1 .
Lemma 4.5. If canceling and Equation 3 hold in G, then the above construction describes a correct identity-based encryption scheme.
Proof. To see that, for all identities id and messages M , sk id
, we first observe that the decryption check will pass, as e(c 2 , h γ 5 h δ 6 ) = 1 by canceling, and
by canceling and Equation 3.
To additionally see that decryption will succeed in recovering the message, we have
where the second equality again follows from canceling and the last from Equation 3.
Theorem 4.6. If weak projecting, canceling, parameter hiding, Equation 3, and generalized correlated subgroup decision hold in G, then the above construction is a IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption scheme.
As we did for our weak IBE construction, we consider how to actualize these abstract requirements in both the composite-order and prime-order settings; for completeness, our composite-order construction and proofs that it satisfies these requirements can be found in Section 5. For the prime-order setting, we can now use our BasicGen construction from Section 3; here, as G = G 8 , we can use our non-augmented construction, as testing membership in G reduces to testing membership in G. We have already proved this setting satisfies weak projecting, canceling, and parameter hiding, and that the nice instances of generalized correlated subgroup decision hold if SXDH holds. As with our weak IBE, Equation 3 holds trivially by the definition of dual orthonormal bases.
We must also consider how to embed G into G as described above; this is also quite simple, however, as we can simply use G i = G i . The augmented auxiliary information µ for the weak scheme furthermore enables computation of the projection maps π G and π H , as knowledge of the spans of { v 1 , . . . , v 6 } and { v * 1 , . . . , v * 6 } allows one to compute a linear transformation that projects from F 8 p onto these spans, which can then be applied in the exponent to map onto G 1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ G 6 and H 1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ H 6 .
As all of the instances of generalized correlated subgroup decision that we use in our proof of Theorem 4.6 are nice, we obtain the following corollary: Corollary 4.7. If SXDH holds in G, where G is constructed from G $ ← − BasicGen(1 k ) as described above, then the instantiation of the above construction in G is an IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption scheme with identity space F p and message space G T .
To prove Theorem 4.6, we proceed through the following series of game transitions:
• Game 0 . The honest IND-CCA1 game.
• Game 1 . Switch the secret keys returned by KeyExt to have additional "duplicate" elements in Finally, we show that if an adversary can win Game 2 then, using weak projection, it can be used to construct an adversary that breaks the weak IND-CCA1 security of the underlying scheme (i.e., the scheme constructed in the previous section). We therefore reduce the full IND-CCA1 security of this scheme to the weak IND-CCA1 security of the embedded scheme.
Following this outline, we begin by adding in extra components to secret keys, and changing decryption accordingly.
Lemma 4.8. If the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption holds, then Game 0 is computationally indistinguishable from Game 1 .
Proof. We assume there exists an adversary A that can distinguish between Game 0 and Game 1 with some non-negligible advantage and use it to construct an adversary B that solves an instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision problem with related non-negligible advantage. We invoke the instance of the assumption parameterized by sets S G := {7, 8}, S H := {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, T 1 = {(7, 8)}, and T 2 = {(1, 2), (7, 8) }, with challenge terms in H.
B receives as input G = (N, G, H, G T , e) and elements
where either (T,
B implicitly sets α = v and gives params := ( G, g 7 , g 8 , e( g 7 , T )) to A.
On KeyExt queries for an identity id , B picks random t, t , δ, δ , σ, σ , η, η $ ← − Z/N Z and returns
, then this is distributed as in Game 1 , with β := z.
On Dec queries for (id , (c 1 , c 2 )), B picks random values t , δ , σ , η $ ← − Z/N Z and checks that e(c 2 , T η id · (T ) η h t id 7 h t 8 h δ 5 h σ 6 ) = 1 and outputs ⊥ if this check fails. Otherwise, it returns
Note that if T = h v 7 , this will produce the same responses as the decryption oracle in Game 0 , and if T = h v 7 h z 1 , this will produce the same responses as the decryption oracle in Game 1 .
Since B knows the public parameters, it can simply use the regular encryption algorithm to produce the challenge ciphertext. It can therefore leverage A's non-negligible advantage in distinguishing between Game 0 and Game 1 to achieve a non-negligible advantage against this instance of the correlated subgroup decision problem.
Next, in Game 2 , we add in duplicate components to the challenge ciphertext as well. This means changing Game 1 as follows:
Lemma 4.9. If the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption holds, then Game 1 is computationally indistinguishable from Game 2 .
Proof. We assume there exists an adversary A that can distinguish between Game 1 and Game 2 with some non-negligible advantage and use it to construct an adversary B that solves an instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision problem with related non-negligible advantage. We invoke the instance of the assumption parameterized by sets S G := {7, 8}, S H := {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, ((1, 2), (7, 8) )}, T 1 = {(7, 8)}, and T 2 = {(1, 2), (7, 8) }, with challenge terms in G.
To start, B receives as input G = (N, G, H, G T , e) and elements
where either (T, On KeyExt queries for an identity id , B chooses random δ, δ , σ, σ , η, η , γ, γ $ ← − Z/N Z and returns
, which, for β := zα , is distributed identically to the key computed in both Game 1 and Game 2 .
On Dec queries of the form (id , (c 1 , c 2 )), B chooses random η , γ , δ , σ 
To produce the challenge ciphertext for id * , B picks b $ ← − {0, 1} and computes
, this is a properly distributed encryption of M b for Game 2 (with s = w). Thus, B can leverage A's non-negligible difference in advantage between these games to achieve a non-negligible advantage against this instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision problem.
Lemma 4.10. If the embedded scheme is weakly IND-CCA1 secure and weak projecting holds inG, then no PPT adversary can achieve a non-negligible advantage in Game 2 .
Proof. We assume there exists an adversary A that achieves a non-negligible advantage in Game 2 , and use it to construct an adversary B that has related non-negligible advantage in the weak IND-CCA1 game for the embedded scheme. To start, B receives as input G = (N, G, H, G T , e, µ) . It then constructs G = (N, G, H, G T , e,μ) with the properties described above; as a reminder, this is done in such a way that B knows the trapdoor information τ and suitable generators g 7 , g 8 , h 7 , and h 8 . It then picks α $ ← − Z/N Z, and gives params := ( G, g 7 , g 8 , e( g 7 , h 7 ) α ) to A. On KeyExt queries for an identity id , B first outputs id as its own KeyExt query to receive back sk id,1 , sk id,2 ∈ H 1 ⊕ H 2 ⊕ H 5 ⊕ H 6 . It then chooses t, t $ ← − Z/N Z and computes its response as
We note that this produces properly distributed keys.
On Dec queries of the form (id , (c 1 , c 2 )), B first chooses a random t $ ← − Z/N Z and checks if e(c 2 , h tid 7 h t 8 ) = 1. If this check fails, it outputs ⊥. (Since t is randomly chosen, there is only a negligible chance that A can produce a query that fails this check but pass the decryption check with the additional terms in H present.) Otherwise, it outputs its own Dec query
where here 1 denotes the identity element in G T . If it receives ⊥ in response, it replies with ⊥ to A. If instead it receives some X ∈ G T , it returns to A the message
To see that this properly simulates the decryption oracle, note that when the decryption checks pass, we have
Moreover, we have e(c 2 , sk id,1 )
(by construction of the decryption algorithm for the embedded weakly secure scheme). and gives (c 1 , c 2 ) as the challenge ciphertext to A. We note that this is a properly distributed ciphertext. When A outputs its guess bit b , B outputs the same bit.
A Composite-Order Instantiation of Our IBE
To show that we can instantiate our IBE constructed in Section 4 (both the weakly and fully IND-CCA1 variants), we must construct a composite-order bilinear group that satisfies weak projecting, canceling, parameter hiding, and generalized correlated subgroup decision. We begin with a symmetric bilinear group (N, G , G T , e ), where N = pqrs for distinct primes p, q, r, and s, and G = G p ⊕ G q ⊕ G r ⊕ G s for G p = g p , G q = g q , G r = g r , and G s = g s . The first three primes are used in our weak scheme, and the last prime s is used to embed the weak scheme into the full scheme.
We then pick random values a, b , 1 ) , and G 6 := (1, g r ) . To provide a membership test for G, we assume that we are given the prime s as part of µ, so pqr and s are separately known, but it is still hard to factor pqr.
Similarly, we define 1 ) , and H 6 := (1, g r ) . We define e :
and set G = (N, G, H, G T := G T , e, µ). It is easy to verify that e satisfies both bilinearity and nondegeneracy. In addition, as pairing elements in any of the two subgroups (e.g., G p and G q ) yields the identity, a case-by-case analysis reveals that canceling is satisfied as well; for example, to show that e(G 1 , H 3 ) = 1, we observe that, to have order p, we must have g p = (g ) αqrs for some α ∈ Z/N Z, and similarly have g q = (g ) βprs for some β ∈ Z/N Z, where g is a generator of G . We therefore have
Projecting is also satisfied, as the Chinese Remainder theorem implies that we can efficiently construct, for example, a value λ p such that
and thus project G into G p and, incorporating the values a and b as well, into the subgroups G i and H i accordingly. Finally, Equation 2 is satisfied, as q ) = 1, so that e(g 1 g 2 , h 1 h 2 ) = e(g 3 g 4 , h 3 h 4 ) = 1 as required.
We note that the message space for the scheme will be the subgroup of G T of order p. This is not the usual case, as messages are typically be assumed to come from the larger group G T . However, this strange feature is circumvented in the prime-order case, where we can adjust things to work with the typical message space of G T . We view this composite-order construction mostly as an instructive demonstration of our proof techniques rather than as a scheme recommended for practice, so we are not overly concerned with the oddity of the message space here.
We show that parameter hiding is satisfied as well in the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1. The parameter hiding requirement in Example 2.7 holds for G = (N, G, H, G T , e, µ) defined as above.
Proof. To prove that the distributions in Example 2.7 are equivalent, we observe that h
). By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the values of a, b modulo q are uniformly random and independent of their values modulo the other primes. Thus, when x = y, the values ax + b and ay + b are distributed uniformly at random modulo q, since f (φ) = aφ + b is a pairwise independent function modulo q.
All it remains to show is that generalized correlated subgroup decision holds in this setting. To do this, we use the generalized subgroup decision assumption, formalized by Bellare et al. [4] . Our formalization also allows for a single prime s to be revealed, and requires subgroup decision hardness only within the subgroups of the other prime orders. We state this as follows:
Given a bilinear group generator BilinearGen, define the following distribution: Proof. We consider an arbitrary instance of generalized correlated subgroup decision described by sets S G , S H , T 1 , and T 2 ; without loss of generality we assume the challenge terms are in G. We associate the pair (1, 2) with the prime p, the pair (3, 4) with the prime q, and the pair (5, 6) with the prime r. In this way, we can re-interpret T 1 and T 2 as subsets of {p, q, r} that differ in precisely one element. We then consider an instance of the generalized subgroup decision assumption for the composite-order group G where the challenge term is either a random element of the subgroup whose order is the product of the primes in T 1 or a random element of the subgroup whose order is the product of the primes in T 2 . We may assume that generators of all prime-order subgroups are given out except for the prime that differs between T 1 and T 2 . Also, for any subset Z of {p, q, r} such that T 1 ∩ Z = ∅ = T 2 ∩ Z, we may assume that a random element is given out from the subgroup whose order is the product of the primes in Z.
We now observe that such elements must suffice to produce the elements of G and H prescribed by S. We choose a, b $ ← − Z/N Z and can then produce all of the required generators, since S cannot include single numbers corresponding to the prime that differentiates between T 1 and T 2 . Now, any tuple of pairs that appears in S and involves the prime for which we are not given a generator must also include a pair that is common to T 1 and T 2 . Hence, we have been given a random element X from the subgroup whose order is the product of the primes corresponding to the pairs in the tuple. To produce the correlated samples, we simply choose a random exponent t $ ← − Z/N Z and take X raised to appropriate powers in terms of a and b. For example, suppose that X is a random element of G p G q , and we are tasked with creating correlated samples from G 1 ⊕ G 3 and G 2 ⊕ G 4 ; then we produce (X, X ta ) and (1, X tb ). The fact that this is properly distributed as a correlated sample follows from the Chinese Remainder theorem, as the values of t modulo p and q are independent and each uniformly random.
By construction, we have now proved the following theorem:
Theorem 5.4. If generalized subgroup decision holds in G as described above, then the instantiation of the construction in Section 4.1 in G is a weakly IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption scheme.
We would also like to prove the corresponding theorem for the fully secure variant. To do this, we need to show that a group G of order N = pqrs can be constructed using the previously defined group G of order pqr. We observe that we could treat G as a subgroup of this larger group G = G ⊕ G s , and restrict ourselves to computations within this subgroup, letting a generator g s for this additional subgroup be known. (While this process of restricting computation to strictly within G might reveal s, we allow s to be known anyway.) We assume that this process of thus "embedding" a group of order pqr into a group G of order pqrs for known s generates the trapdoor knowledge τ that allows one to efficiently compute projection maps from G into G .
We then define G := G 1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ G 8 = G 2 , with the generators g 1 , . . . , g 6 and h 1 , . . . , h 6 defined as before, and the additional generators defined as g 7 := (g s , g a s ), g 8 := (1, g b s ) h 7 := (g b s , 1), and h 8 := (g a s , g −1 s ) for a , b $ ← − Z/N Z, where N = pqrs. We define e by e((g, g ), (h, h )) := e (g, h) · e (g , h ) ∀g, g , h, h ∈ G, and thus use G T := G T . Finally, knowledge of s allows one to project onto G pqr and H pqr , and the correlated subgroup decision assumption for this expanded setting follows from the generalized subgroup decision assumption for G of order N = pqrs by the same argument applied above for the case of three primes, which proves the following theorem:
Theorem 5.5. If generalized subgroup decision holds in G, then the instantiation of the construction in Section 4.2 in G is an IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption scheme.
• . This is indistinguishable from Game 3 by subgroup decision.
Following this outline, we begin in Game 1 by adding a "duplicate" G 3 ⊕ G 4 component to the ciphertext. Proof. We break the transition from Game 3,i−1 to Game 3,i into two nearly identical steps. In the first step, we change the i-th key to have a random component in H 3 ⊕H 4 on sk id,1 . In the second step, we also make this change on sk id,2 . We assume there exists an adversary A that, for some i, can distinguish between the first step and Game 3,i−1 with some non-negligible advantage and use it to construct an adversary B that solves an instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision problem with related non-negligible advantage (assuming parameter hiding holds). We invoke the instance of the assumption parameterized by sets S G := {1, 2; ((1, 2), (3, 4) )}, S H := {1, 2, 5, 6; ((3, 4), (5, 6)), ((1, 2), (3, 4) )}, T 1 = {(1, 2), (5, 6)}, and T 2 = {(1, 2), (3, 4) , (5, 6)}, with challenge terms in H.
To start, B therefore receives as input the bilinear group G = (N, G, H, G T , e, µ) and elements (g 1 , g 2 , h 1 , h 2 , h 5 , h 6 , g 1,3 := g
